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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit, at the European University 
Institute, was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as a 
forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove valuable 
to Community policy-making.
In October 1984, the EPU, in collaboration with the 
University of Strasbourg and TEPSA, organised a conference to 
examine in detail the Draft Treaty Establishing the European 
Union. This Working Paper, presented at the conference and 
revised in light of the discussion, will appear in book form later 
in 1985 along with other studies of the Draft Treaty.
Further information about the work of the European Policy 
Unit can be obtained from the Director, at the European University 





















































































































































































T h is  R ep ort is in th re e  p a r t s .  P art I deals with the question 
w h e th er ,  assuming th at  the n e c e s s a ry  political will e x is t s ,  th ere  
are  any s t r ic t ly  legal or  constitu tional o b s ta c le s  to the United 
Kingdom's access ion  to the European Union. Our conclusion is th at  
th e re  are  no such  o b s ta c le s .
In P art I I ,  we con sid er  w heth er  the political will e x i s t s .  Our 
conclusion is th a t ,  fo r  the time being at any r a te ,  it does n ot.
The United Kingdom governm ent has not y e t  taken  a policy decision 
on th e  D raft T r e a ty ,  e i th e r  in princip le  or in d e ta il ,  but it is 
a lready reason ab ly  c le ar  th at  the govern m ent's  position is likely 
to be u n fav ou rab le .  A part from the L ib e ra l-S D P  Alliance we have 
been unable to iden tify  any su b s ta n t ia l  body of opinion, in 
Parliament or in the c o u n try  g e n e ra lly ,  which fav o u rs  the proposal 
or is even p rep ared  to tak e  it se r io u s ly .
P art II  also co n sid ers  the ways in which the D raft  T re a ty  might 
re a ch  'the  political agenda' in the United Kingdom.
In P art  I I I ,  we t r y  to explain  the n egative  c h a r a c te r  of B r i t is h  
a t t i tu d e s ,  and we e x p r e s s  some re s e rv a t io n s  of our own about the 
D raft  T r e a ty .
One of the m isfortunes of those  who comment on European a f fa irs  in 
B r ita in  is th at  th ey  run the r i s k ,  if  th ey  ap p ear e n th u s ia s t ic ,  of 
being called "e u ro -fa n a t ic s "  at home o r ,  if th ey  do n o t ,  of being 
called "anti-com m unautaire" e lsew here in E u rop e . Our R ep ort may 
appear negative  in tone and may th e re fo re  d isappoint those  who look 
for  a more positive re sp o n se  from the United Kingdom. B u t we feel 
th at  it is more im portant for  us to s ta te  th e  problem s, as we see 
them , fra n k ly  and re a lis t ica lly  than  to re fra in  from cr it ica l  
comment as a kind of p erson al pledge of loyalty  to th e  Community.
We believe th at  the cause  of European Union will not be prom oted, 
and may indeed be h in d e re d , by  sweeping the d if f icu lt ie s  u n d er the 
























































































































































































PART Is LEGAL AND CONSTITUTION AL IMPLICATIONS
For the United Kingdom, the D raft T re a ty  e s tab l ish in g  th e  European 
Union, like the T re a t ie s  of P aris  and Rome, p re s e n ts  few problems 
of access ion  or in co rp oratio n . The constitu t ion a l d if f ic u lt ie s ,  
stemming from a la rg e ly  u nw ritten  con stitu t ion  and the doctr ine  of 
the abso lute  suprem acy of Parliam ent, co n ce rn  en tren ch m en t of the 
T re a ty  as an autonomous and paramount legal o rd e r .
The power to e n te r  into the European Union
It  is almost su ff ic ien t to say  th a t ,  in re lation  to e x te rn a l  
a f fa i r s ,  the United Kingdom remains a m onarchy . T he e x te rn a l  
trea ty -m ak in g  power is a p re ro g at iv e  r ig h t  of th e  Crow n, which 
cannot be impugned within the Kingdom in or  by  th e  c o u rts  [ 1 ] ,  As 
a coro llary  of the d octr in e  of parliam entary  su p rem acy , how ever, 
t re a t ie s  are  not d ire c tly  applicable within the Kingdom, and the 
co u rts  cannot take jud icia l notice of them until th ey  are  embodied 
in s ta tu te s  enacted  by  Parliam ent. I t  has re c e n t ly  been indicated  
th at English  co u rts  will re co g n ise  p r in c ip les  of custom ary 
in ternational law as forming p a rt  of E n glish  law [ 2 ] ,  but th is  does 
not include t r e a ty  ob ligat ion s ; for  th e s e ,  leg islation  is 
n e c e s s a r y .
The legal situation was b e s t  summed up b y  Lord A tkin , s it t in g  in 
the Ju d ic ia l  Committee of the P riv y  Council ( th e n  the "Suprem e 
C ourt" of the B r i t is h  E m p ire) :
Within th e  B r i t is h  Empire th e re  is a w ell-es tab lish ed  ru le  th at 
th e  making of a t re a ty  is an e x e c u tiv e  a c t ,  while the 
perform ance of its  ob lig at ion s , if th ey  entail a lteration  of 
the ex is t in g  domestic law, re q u ire s  leg is la t iv e  ac tio n . Unlike 
some o th er  c o u n tr ie s ,  the stipu lations of a t r e a ty  duly 
ra tif ied  do not within the Em pire, by  v ir tu e  of the t r e a ty  
alone, have the fo rce  of law. I f  th e  national e x e c u t iv e ,  the 
governm ent of the d a y , decide to in cu r  the ob ligations of a 




























































































r is k  of obtain ing the a s s e n t  of Parliament to th e  n e c e s sa ry  
s ta tu te  or  s ta tu te s .  To make them selves as se cu re  as possible  
th ey  will o ften  in such  ca s e s  b efore  final ra tif ica tio n  seek  to 
obtain from Parliament an e x p re ss io n  of approval. B u t it has 
n e v e r  been s u g g e s te d ,  and it is not the law, th a t  su ch  an 
e x p re ss io n  of approval o p era tes  as law, or th a t  in law it 
p rec lu d es  the assen tin g  Parliam ent, o r  any su b se q u e n t  
Parliam ent, from re fu s in g  to give i ts  sanction  to any 
leg is la t iv e  proposals th at  may su b se q u e n tly  be b ro u g h t before  
i t . [ 3 ]
T hu s the power of access ion  to the European Union is e xc lu siv e ly  
th at  of the Crown ( i . e . ,  de f a c t o , th e  governm ent) independent of 
Parliam ent. B u t  the power of implementation, or of in co rp oratio n , 
belongs e x c lu s iv e ly ,  in tu r n ,  to Parliam ent.
T he power to implement the European Union
The honouring of t re a ty  obligations in the United Kingdom is both 
fa c i l i ta te d , and at the same time im perilled, by  th e  doctr ine  of 
Parliam entary  sup rem acy . A ccording to th a t  d o c tr in e ,  th e re  is no 
law which Parliament cannot e n a c t ,  or re p e a l ,  in its  o rd in ary  
leg is la tive  c a p a c ity ;  it can make or unmake any law w h atsoev er .
In elu cidating the d o c tr in e ,  Dicey formulated th re e  ce n tra l  
p ro p o s it io n s :
F i r s t , th e re  is no law which Parliament cannot chan ge . . .  
ac t in g  in its  o rd in ary  leg is la tive  c h a r a c te r .  A Bill fo r  
reform ing the House of Commons, a Bill fo r  abolishing the House 
of L o rd s ,  a Bill to give London a m unicipality , a Bill to make 
valid m arriages  c e le b ra te d  by  a p reten d ed  c lergym an , who is 
found a f te r  th e ir  ce lebra tion  to be not in o r d e r s ,  are  each 
equally  within the com petency of P arliam ent, th e y  each  may be 
passed  in su b stan tia lly  the same m anner, th ey  none of them when 
p assed  will b e ,  legally sp e ak in g , a whit more sacred  or 




























































































nor less  than an Act of P arliam ent, which can be repealed  as it 
had been passed  by Parliam ent, and cannot be annulled b y  any 
o th e r  power. S e c o n d ly , th e re  is u n d er th e  English  
constitu tion  no marked or c le ar  d istinction  betw een laws which 
are  not fundamental or con stitu tion a l and th ose  laws which are  
fundamental or co nstitu tional . . . .  T h ir d ly , th e re  does not 
e x is t  . . .  any person  or body of p e rs o n s ,  e x e c u t iv e ,  leg is la tive  
or ju d ic ia l ,  which can pronounce void any  enactm ent p assed  by  
the B r i t is h  Parliament on the ground of su ch  enactm ent being 
opposed to the co n s t i tu t io n ,  or on any ground w h atev er ,  e x c e p t ,  
of c o u rs e ,  i ts  being  repealed  b y  Parliam ent. [4]
Herein lies both  the s t r e n g th  and the w eakness of the United 
Kingdom c o n stitu t io n . The law re c o g n ise s  no d if fe re n ce  between 
constitu tional law s, organ ic  laws or o rd in ary  law s. T h e re  is no 
h ie ra rc h y  of norm s; no law is "a whit more sa cred  or immutable" 
than a n o th e r .  A Bill seek in g  th e  most fundam ental con stitu tion a l 
chan ge e n co u n te rs  no g r e a te r  p roced u ra l o b s ta c le s  than  does one 
seek ing  to unite  two or th re e  English  p a r is h e s .  In d eed , a s ta tu te  
implementing the European Union could commence its  parliam entary  
p ro g re s s  as a p riv ate  m ember's b il l ,  how ever unlikely  th a t  may b e .
Nor are  th e re  su b s ta n t iv e  d if f ic u lt ie s :  if  Parliam ent is sup rem e,
it may d e le g a te ,  or d isable  i ts e l f  o f ,  any  p a r t icu la r  power or 
powers it w ishes. Su ch  is th e  d esign  and fo r c e ,  for  the p re s e n t  
Communities, of Section 2 of th e  European Communities Act 1972, 
which in corporated  th e  T re a t ie s  of P aris  and Rome [ 5 ] .  B u t owing 
to the ab se n ce  of any d istinction  betw een d if fe re n t  ty p e s  of law s, 
th e re  e x is ts  in the United Kingdom con stitu t ion  no means of 
en tren ch m en t of legal norm s. T h is  is what Lord Scarm an calls  "th e  
h e lp le ssn e ss  of the law in the face  of the leg is la t iv e  so v e re ig n ty  
of Parliam ent" [6] and it co n s t i tu te s  the ap p aren tly  insurm ountable  
problem for  th ose  who se ek  to d ra f t  and e n tre n c h  a B r i t is h  Bill of 




























































































The European Communities Act s u c c e ss fu l ly  in co rp o ra te s  the 
Community legal o rd e r  in the United Kingdom for  th e  time being b u t ,  
at le a s t  accord in g  to the trad itional th eo ry  of B r i t is h  
con stitu tion a l law, it does not and cannot e n tre n c h  i t .  The 
th eo re t ica l  p o ss ib ility  of abrogation  of the Community norm, by 
simple parliam entary  m ajority , remains con stitu tionally  valid 
w hatever the b rea ch  of Community law, and the th re a t  of su ch  a 
co u rse  from some B r it is h  q u a r te r s  is one of the c a u se s  of continued 
discom fort in viewing the commitment of the United Kingdom to the 
Communities.
The r ig o u rs  of s t r ic t  ad h eren ce  to the doctr ine  of Parliam entary 
suprem acy have been m itigated , in the view of some ju d g e s ,  by  
B r i t is h  membership of the p re s e n t  Communities. Lord D enning, 
M aster of the R olls , su g g e sted  in an o b ite r  dictum in 1979 th a t  the 
d octr in e  of implied repeal ( le x  p o ste r io r  d erogat lege  p r io r e ) no 
lo n g er  o p era tes  in English  law to nullify  Community obligations in 
the face  of unintentionally  in co n s is te n t su b se q u e n t  s ta tu te  law; 
for  Parliament to ab rogate  the Community tre a t ie s  it must do so 
in tentionally  and e x p re s s ly  [ 8 ] .  Implied su p p ort fo r  th is  
proposition is indicated in a more r e c e n t  judgm ent of Lord Diplock 
in th e  House of Lords [9] . B u t it  seems to be th e  case  th a t ,  if 
Parliament chose  to leg is la te  e x p lic i t ly ,  the co u rts  could not 
re fu s e  to give e f fe c t  to its  will. So long as parliam entary  
so v e re ig n ty  is in d e stru c t ib le  by  legislation or by  any  o th e r  m eans, 
con stitu t ion a l th eo ry  can accommodate no more.
T h e re  is one possib le  p ro c e d u re ,  as y e t  not fully te s te d  in the 
c o u r ts ,  by  which laws may become e n tre n ch e d  in the United 
Kingdom. It  was not attem pted in the enactm ent of the European 
Communities A ct, but might be con sid ered  if the governm ent sought 
to implement the European Union. What a re  called "m anner and 
form" s ta tu te s  impose proced u ral r e s t r a in t s  upon the fu tu re  
ac t iv it ie s  of Parliament in the manner p re s c r ib e d  b y  the s ta tu te .
The area  of sovere ign  pow er, as d is t in c t  from p ro c e d u re ,  remains 
lim itless ; bu t by  th is  th e o ry ,  s o v e re ig n ty  is d iv isib le  between 
Parliament as ord inarily  c o n stitu ted  and Parliament as con stitu ted  




























































































T h u s ,  accord in g  to th is  th e o ry ,  Parliament could by s ta tu te  
in corp orate  the obligations of the European Union within the 
domestic system  of the United Kingdom, and provide within the 
s ta tu te  i tse lf  th at it may not be amended or repealed  save by  
re c o u rse  to some specific  p roced u re  -  s a y ,  a w eighted m ajority in 
Parliam ent. Any o rd in ary  (p u rp o r te d )  s ta tu te  su b se q u e n tly  seek ing  
to ab rogate  the Union by  repeal of the in co rp oratin g  s ta tu te  (or  
p a r ts  of it)  would th en  be a nu lli ty .
T h e re  has  been some judicia l recognition  of manner and form 
r e s t r a in t s ,  p articu lar ly  in the Commonwealth [ 1 0 ] ,  a lthough some 
opinion denies th e ir  e x is te n c e  [1 1 ] .  T h e re  is also some d eb ate  as 
to what may legitim ately co n s t i tu te  su ch  a r e s t r a in t .  N ev erth e­
le s s ,  su ch  a device might f ru it fu lly  be in co rp orated  into any 
enabling s ta tu te  for  the European Union, and if s u c c e s s fu l  would 
more closely  align B r i t is h  co nstitu tional ad h eren ce  to Community 
norms to th a t  of o th e r  member s ta te s .
S u b je c t  to th a t ,  the qu estion  of United Kingdom access io n  to the 
European Union is ultimately a qu estion  of political rea lity  r a th e r  
than constitu tional or legal th e o ry .  I t  would depend on the 
political will of the governm ent of the day and th e  size of its  
Parliam entary majority . The r is k s  for  a governm ent seek in g  to 
acced e to the Union and to in co rp orate  its  p rov isions in domestic 
law are  il lu s tra ted  by  the h is to ry  of access ion  to th e  p re s e n t  
Communities.
The election m anifesto of the C on serv ativ e  P a rty  in 1970 an d , a f te r  
th e  e lec tio n , th e  C onservative  G overnm ent's  White P a p e r ,  "T h e  
United Kingdom and the European Com munities", contained a 
commitment to e n try  if the term s were a c c e p ta b le .  A fter  
n egotia tion , the governm ent secu red  a m ajority of 102 in th e  House 
of Commons on a motion approving the princip le  of e n t r y .  On the 
Second Reading of the European Communities B il l ,  h o w ever, the 
governm ent's  majority was red u ced  to 8 , and the m ajority on T h ird  
Reading was only 17. T h u s ,  no tw ithstanding a c c e s s io n ,  the 
obligations aris in g  from access io n  were in co rp orated  in domestic 




























































































F in a lly , we should b r ie f ly  mention the th eo ret ica l  p oss ib ilit ies  of 
legislation by  P rivate  Member's Bill or by  a Bill in trodu ced  in the 
House of Lords r a th e r  than the House of Commons.
The governm ent could not be compelled, ag a in st  its  will, to accede 
to th e  Union by a P rivate  Member's B il l ;  nor would a P rivate  
Member's Bill seek in g  to in co rp orate  the law of the Union in 
domestic law have any p ro sp e c ts  of s u c c e ss  ag a in st  th e  will of the 
governm ent. The same applies to a Bill in trod u ced  in the House of 
L ord s where the governm ent does not n e c e s sa r i ly  command a m ajority , 
s ince the legislation would have to pass  the Commons. The only 
u se fu ln e ss  of a P rivate  Member's Bill would be as a means of 
stim ulating d eb ate .
It  is possib le  th a t ,  if the governm ent were anxious to leg is la te  
and were u n ce r ta in  of its  majority in the House of Commons, a 
European Union Bill would be in trodu ced  f i r s t  in the House of 
L o rd s ,  where it might re ce iv e  more sym pathetic  c o n s id e ra t io n , so 
b lunting  the edge of opposition in the House of Commons. T h is  is 
not p ro b ab le .  In the ab sen ce  of a c le ar  m ajority in the House of 





























































































PART I I :  SOCIO -P OLITICAL ASSESSMENT
T his  p art  of the re p o rt  is divided into seven  s e c t io n s .  Section  1 
s e ts  out the public reactio n s  of governm ent M inisters an d , in 
summary form, the points made to us in informal d iscu ss ion  with 
governm ent s o u rc e s .  Section  2 deals with the political (as  
opposed to s t r ic t ly  legal)  d iff icu lt ies  fo r  a governm ent seek ing  to 
promote a T re a ty  for  European Union, and with the ways in which the 
p re s e n t  D raft T re a ty  might re a c h  th e  political agenda in 
Parliam ent. Section 3 deals with a tt i tu d es  of the major UK 
political p a r t ie s .  It  d isc u sse s  in tu r n :  the p re s e n t  a tt i tu d es
of the fou r main p a r t ie s ;  the likelihood of any s ig n ifican t 
ch an g es  of a ttitu d e in th e  n ear  fu tu r e ;  and the re la tio nsh ip  of 
the views of MEPs on the one h an d , and those  of MPs and hom e-based  
p a r ty  re s e a r c h  departm ents and a c t iv is ts  on the o th e r .  Section  4 
s k e tc h e s  the view s, in so far  as th ey  have been  form ulated , of 
leading in te re s t  g ro u p s . Section  5 deals with th e  European 
Movement. Section 6 comments on the a tt i tu d es  of th e  media.
Section  7 deals with public opinion as a whole.
Section  1: The Government
(a )  Public A tt itu d e s :
At the time of w ritin g , th e  United Kingdom governm ent had not 
adopted a definite  policy on the D raft T r e a t y .  B u t a good 
indication of the governm ent's  in itial reaction  has been given by  
Mr Malcolm R ifk in d , M inister of S ta te  at the Foreign  and Common­
wealth O ffice  and U .K .  re p re s e n ta t iv e  on th e  ad hoc ( 'D oog e ')  
committee on in st itu tion s  of the Community se t  up at the 
Fontainebleau  summit.
A nsw ering a Parliam entary Question in the House of Commons on 27 
Ju n e  1984, Mr. R ifk ind said :
Although th e re  a re  some a s p e c ts  of the Spinelli re p o rt  to which 




























































































proposals  th at we cannot su p p o rt .  I draw special a tten tion  to 
the proposal to phase out the national veto  a f te r  10 y e a rs  and 
th e  proposal to in crease  the powers of the European 
Parliam ent. We have made it c le ar  th at those  are  th e  two main 
recommendations that we cannot su p p o rt .  [12]
In answ er to o th e r  Parliam entary  Q u estion s , both  Mr R ifk ind and the 
Prime M inister have s t r e s s e d  th e  scope available u n d er th e  ex is t in g  
tre a t ie s  :
- T h e  Prime M inister : We are  not convinced  of the need for  a 
new t r e a ty  s ince  the e x is t in g  tre a t ie s  provide p len ty  of scope 
for the f u r th e r  development of th e  Community. [13]
-M r. R ifk ind : Our view is th at th e  e x is t in g  tre a t ie s  provide 
for  th e  f u r th e r  development of the Community and we are  not 
p ersu ad ed  of the need for a new t r e a ty .  [14]
At the time of the f i r s t  d eb ates  in the European Parliament on the 
new tr e a ty  (Sep tem b er 1 9 8 3 ) ,  Mr R ifk ind gave a yet more general 
view of the governm ent's  approach  :
The European Parliament has focu ssed  our atten tion  on the issue 
[how the Community can be improved] . . .  in its  debate  on [the  
Spinelli]  re p o rt  which a rg u e s  for  a more elaborate  Community 
s t r u c tu r e  with g re a te r  powers for  its  c e n tra l  in s t itu t io n s .
T h at is not our ap p ro ach . To u s ,  in s t itu tio n s  must be 
s u b s e rv ie n t  to policies. C loser co -op eration  should not be 
forced  but must grow out of p rac tica l  ways in which as a 
Community we can work to g e th e r  for  our common good. S u b s ta n ce  
and re a lity  must come b efore  form . [15]
He went on to lis t  some of th e  co n c re te  areas  where 'working 
to g e th e r  can pay real d iv id en d s '.
(b )  Informal in d ic a t io n s :
T he public pronouncem ents quoted above show th at the United Kingdom 
governm ent is likely  to be opposed in princip le  to two of the 
fundam ental fe a tu re s  of th e  D raft T r e a ty :  the phasing out of the
veto and th e  in cre a se  in the powers of th e  Parliam ent. In 




























































































some of them no le ss  fundam ental. We set out the points as th ey  
have been made to us in summary fo r m :-
(1 )  R elationsh ip  with th e  Community T r e a t ie s :  T h e re  is nothing to
p rev en t the p arties  to the Community T re a t ie s  ag ree in g  to a new 
T re a ty  which would su p ersed e  the e x is t in g  t r e a t ie s .  But such  
agreem ent must be unanim ou s.'  The provision in th e  D raft T re a ty  
w hereby  it would tak e  e f fe c t  once ra tif ie d  b y  Member S ta te s  
re p re s e n t in g  tw o -th ird s  of the population of the Community is 
c o n tra ry  to in ternational law. (A rt ic les  41 and 54 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of T r e a t i e s . )
(2 )  Com petence: A rtic les  11 and 12 have the e f fe c t  of making it
co n s id erab ly  e a s ie r  than  it now is to give com petence to the union 
r a th e r  than  proceed b y  cooperation among th e  Member S ta te s .  I t  is 
not c le a r  what sort of m ajority in Council would be re q u ired  to 
make the step  from cooperation to common action .
(3 )  Appointment of th e  C ourt of J u s t i c e :  A rticle  30 g ives  the
Parliament the function of appointing half  of the members of the 
C o u rt ,  the o th e r  half being appointed by  the Council. Not only 
would th is  d e stro y  the convention th at th e  Court of J u s t ic e  is 
composed of ju d ges  re p re s e n t in g  each  of th e  national law system s of 
the Community, but it is in h e re n tly  ob jectionable  for  the 
le g is la tu re  to appoint the ju d ic ia ry .  T h e re  is nothing comparable 
in the p roced u re  for  appointment of in tern atio n a l t r ib u n a ls .  The 
n e a re s t  parallel is the nomination of cand id ates  for  ju d g e s  on the 
European C ourt of Human R ig h ts  b y  th e  national grou ps in the 
Council of Europe Assembly -  but those  nominations a re  in e f fe c t  
made by  the S ta te s  p a r t ie s .  It  is  an almost u n iv e rsa l 
constitu tional p rac tice  in domestic law fo r  th e  e x e c u tiv e  to 
appoint the ju d ic ia ry ,  w hich, once appointed , is e n tire ly  
in d ep en d en t .  T h is  provision would politic ise  the appointment of 
the Ju d g e s  in a most u n d esirab le  way.
(4 )  L eg is la t ion : The e f fe c t  of A rticle  3 8 (4 )  seems to be th at a
Council d ra ft  amended by  th e  Commission and adopted b y  the 
Parliament will pass into law u n less  the Council can m uster a 
qualified m ajority to r e je c t  i t .



























































































(5 )  B u d g e t :  The e f fe c t  of A rticle  7 1 (2 )  is th at the p roced u re  for
adopting organic  laws applies to amendment of the p re se n t  system  of 
Own R eso u rc e s  or creation  of any new system  to rep lace  i t .  T hat 
g ives the Parliament a su b stan tia l  role in a decision which at 
p re s e n t  is in the hands of the Council and Member S ta te s  (on a 
proposal by  the Commission) u n d er A rticle  201 E E C . A rticle  72 
e ffe c t iv e ly  abolishes  the p re s e n t  d istinction  betw een ob ligatory
and n o n -o b lig a to ry  e x p e n d itu re .  A rticle  76 ch an g es  the p re s e n t  
b u d g eta ry  p roced u re  and , as a re s u lt  of th e  chan ge  b ro u g h t about by 
A rticle  72 , g ives Parliament powers in relation to ob ligatory  
e x p en d itu re  fa r  beyond what it now h a s .  B y  A rticle  7 6 ( 2 ) ( f )  
Parliament may on second reading r e je c t  by  a qualified majority 
amendments adopted by the C ouncil. T his  g ives  Parliament the last  
word on all b u d g eta ry  is su e s  and , in e f f e c t ,  th e  power to fo rce  the 
Member S ta te s  to in cre a se  domestic tax a t io n .
(6 )  T he Commission: In addition to its  role in tab ling  amendments
to leg is la tion  u n d er  A rticle  39 , A rticle  40 g ives the Commission
the e x c lu siv e  power to issu e  regu la tion s  and d ecisions re q u ire d  for 
the implementation of law s. I t  only has to inform Parliament and 
the C ouncil. T he Commission is  also given th e  r ig h t  to oppose 
amendments approved by  Council or  by  Parliament to the b u d g et on 
its  f i r s t  re a d in g , su ch  opposition having the re s u lt  th at the 
re lev an t arm of th e  b u d g etary  au th o rity  must take  a f r e s h  decision 
by  qualified m ajority on second re a d in g . On th e  o th e r  h an d , the 
Commission loses its  e x c lu siv e  r ig h t  to in itiate  leg is la t ion : by
A rticle  3 7 (2 )  it must in trod u ce  a d ra ft  if asked  to do so by  
Parliament or Council, or if it fails  to do so , Parliament or 
Council may in trodu ce a d r a f t .
(7 )  Ju d ic ia l  Review : A rticle  43 e x te n d s  the powers of review  by
the E C J  co n s id e ra b ly .  One point (which could be an improvement on 
the p re s e n t  s itu ation) is th at an equal r ig h t  of appeal and equal 
treatm ent is given for  all th e  in s t itu tio n s  b e fo re  the C ourt of 
J u s t i c e .  T h is  would appear to have the e ffe c t  of giving a r ig h t 
of action ag a in st  the Parliam ent, which does not now e x is t  in a 
num ber of in s ta n c e s .  The A rticle  gives th e  C ourt ju r isd ict io n  to



























































































impose sanctions on a Member S ta te  'fa iling  to fulfil its  
obligation u n d er the law of the Union'. Similar power is given to 
th e  European Council in ca ses  of p e rs is te n t  violation of 
fundamental law s, by  A rticle  44. In re la tion  to fundam ental law s, 
u n d er A rticle  4 the Union is to take  a decision on its  access io n  to 
the European Convention on Human R ig h ts  (ECH R) and th e  UN 
C ov en an ts .  The U .K .  governm ent has h ith e r to  s tre n u o u sly  opposed 
the idea of Community access ion  to th e  ECHR and would have similar 
o b jection s  to i ts  access ion  to the C o v en an ts .
(8 )  Monetary m a tte rs :  The D raft T r e a ty  e n v isa g e s  rad ica l moves
tow ards m onetary union u n d er  its  p rov isions on th e  European 
m onetary system  and fu n d . Partic ipation  would be ob lig atory  as 
would the partia l e lection of national r e s e r v e s  to the EMF. The 
role of the ecu  would be expanded to th at of a r e s e r v e  c u r r e n c y .
(9 )  D efence : The o b jec t iv es  of th e  D raft T r e a ty  r e f e r  to s e c u r ity
and d efen ce  m atte rs .  T h ese  are  not e lab orated  in any co h eren t 
m anner but th e re  are  re fe r e n c e  to cooperation in f ie lds ran g in g  
from arms sa le s ,  MBFR and disarmament to g en era l s e c u r i ty  (A rtic le  
9 ) .  T h ese  aims are  u nlikely  to be accep tab le  to all the Member 
S t a t e s .
(10)  Forms of Cooperation: The D raft T re a ty  p rop oses  two levels  of
combined action by Member S ta te s :  common action and coop eration ,
th e  form er re fe r r in g  to a re as  where the Union has e x c lu siv e  
com petence. Political cooperation i ts e l f  is implicitly covered  by 
cooperation but both head in gs  remain o b s cu re  at k ey  points  in the 
D raft T r e a ty .
(11) G eneral: The D raft T re a ty  attem pts to codify  a fa r  wider
ran g e  of ac t iv it ie s  than is c u r r e n t ly  cov ered  by  th e  Community 
T re a t ie s  but without su ff ic ie n t  detail to make fo r  c o n s is te n c y  or 
c la r i ty .  In addition, it allows for  operational p ra c t ic e s  to be 
decided by  in st itu tio n s  and o th e r  bodies at a la te r  s ta g e .  T h is  
presum ably means th at th e  ultimate power to determ ine th e  shape of 
Union In s t itu t io n s  would r e s t  with the Parliam ent.



























































































Section  2: Parliam ent:
We have su g g e sted  in Part I th at when a governm ent has made up its  
mind and has a reasonable  majority in th e  House of Commons, it can 
do almost w hatever it w ishes. However, in the 1970s and 1980s, it 
has  become le ss  c le ar  th at th is  is so . S itu ations have ar isen  
where a governm ent has needed to re ly  on the support or  benevolent 
n e u tra li ty  of o th e r  g ro u p s , the 'L ib -L a b  P a c t1 of 1977/78 being one 
notable exam ple. While th is  is not in i tse lf  u n p re c e d e n te d , the 
European Community has become a new and sep ara te  ideological issue  
in B r i t is h  p o lit ics ,  and has a lready been resp o n sib le  for  u p sett in g  
what were once thought to be the 'normal' p ro c e s s e s  of governm ent 
in the United Kingdom.
It is worth reca llin g  th a t ,  a f te r  access ion  in 1973, the issu e  of 
membership did not vanish  from the political agenda in the United 
Kingdom: in s te a d , new p re c e d e n ts  were set which might be followed
again ov er  th is  or  any o th er  proposal for  European Union. In 
p a r t ic u la r ,  in 1974 the Labour P arty  committed i tse lf  in its  
election m anifesto to ren egotia te  the term s of e n tr y  and to hold a 
referend um  on them. A fter  the election th e  Labou r governm ent 
declared  i ts e l f  bound b y  th e  re su lt  of the re feren d u m . T h is ,  it 
has  been held [1 6 ] ,  had the e f fe c t  of u su rp in g  th e  so v e re ig n ty  of 
Parliam ent. It  ce rta in ly  makes it even more d iff icu lt  to define 
with any p recis ion  where th e  law stops and politics begin  !
I t  may well be th a t ,  even if a fu tu re  governm ent were committed to 
a t r e a ty  fo r  European Union and secu red  th e  approval of Parliam ent, 
it would now also feel bound to submit to a b inding re feren d u m . 
T h u s ,  governm ent support for  access ion  to a new t re a ty  is still  a 
n e c e s s a r y ,  but p erhap s  not a s u f f ic ie n t ,  condition of a c c e s s io n .
The 1975 R eferendum  campaign also marked a n o th e r  d e p a rtu re  from 
'normal' UK p rac tice  -  th is  time o v er  co llective  C abinet re s p o n s i­
b il i ty .  Labou r M inisters were seen  to oppose one a n o th e r  in the



























































































R eferendum  campaign. A gain, th is  happened a f te r  access io n  had 
been accomplished by  a re la tiv e ly  united (C o n se rv a tiv e )  C ab in et ,  
re la tiv e ly  su re  of its  Commons m ajority . T he e v e n ts  of 1975 were 
a way of gett ing  the Labour P arty  'off. the hook' of its  own deep 
divisions on the is s u e :  but su ch  problems could r e c u r  over  
European Union, w hatever the p a rty  of governm ent.
As to the ways in which th e  D raft T re a ty  now proposed might be 
b ro u g h t to Parliam ent's  a t te n tio n ,  th e  following p ossib ilit ies  
e x is t .  ( I t  is important to em phasise th at th ey  are  not equivalent 
to one a n o th e r ,  in th e  sen se  th a t ,  if followed, th ey  would lead to 
the same r e s u l t .  Some might be in appropriate  in the circum ­
s ta n c e s ,  and more than  one might be followed c o n c u rre n t ly .  E xcep t 
in the last  c a s e ,  we c o n c e n tra te  on what might be done in the House 
of Commons. )
( i)  Government motion. We th in k  th is  u n lik e ly , u n less  
con sid erab le  p re s s u re  were g en erated  from the Dooge Committee 
and/or th e re  were ev idence  of c o n se n su s  on modification of the 
D raft T re a ty  such  as to re n d e r  it more to th e  G overnm ent's  l ik in g .
( ii)  Opposition motion (on an 'Opposition D a y ') .  T h is  would have 
to be thought to have political b en e fits  for  th e  Opposition 
outw eighing any em b arrass in g  revelation  of d if fe r e n c e s .  The 
L ib era ls  have one su ch  day at th e ir  d isp o sa l ,  h a lf  of which th ey  
have made available to the SD P.
(iii)  P riv ate  Member's (Monday or F r id a y )  Motion. T h is  would 
normally be easy  for th e  Government to n e u tra lise  or  d e fe a t .  I f  
taken  in P rivate  Members' time, w hatever was said would not have 
the s ta tu s  of definitive consid eration  of th e  te x t  of the D raft 
T re a ty  by  the House.
( iv )  A 'T en  Minute Rule' B il l .  T his  is u sually  re g a rd e d  as a 
u sefu l method of ventilating  the ideas which su ch  a Bill c o n ta in s ;  
it is p erh ap s  not a likely  chan nel for  con sid era tion  of the D raft 
T r e a ty .



























































































(v )  Q u estions. See the previous S ectio n .
(v i)  Consideration by  a Se lec t  Committee of the House of Commons.
P oten tia lly , th re e  Committees might be in volved : th e  European
Legislation e t c .  Committee, the Foreign  A ffairs  Committee, and the 
T r e a s u r y  and Civil S e rv ice  Committee. The term s of re fe r e n c e  of 
the European Legislation Committee are  to "co n sid e r  d ra ft  proposals 
by  the Commission of the European Communities for  leg is la t io n , and 
o th e r  documents published for  subm ission to the Council of 
M inisters or to the European Council, and to re p o rt  w hether th ese  
ra ise  qu estio n s  of legal o r  political im p o r t a n c e . . . "  e t c .  At 
p re se n t  the D raft T re a ty  does not come within th ese  term s of 
r e fe r e n c e ;  but i f ,  fo r  exam ple, it or  its  su b s ta n c e  became a 
d iscu ssion  document at a European C ouncil, th en  it would come 
within th e  term s of re fe re n c e  and be a candiate  to be recommended 
for d e b a te ,  at which stag e  th e  governm ent would have to a rra n g e  for 
the House to debate  it .  A final re p o rt  of the Dooge Committee 
would also be a cand id ate .
Both  the Fore ign  A ffairs  Committee and the T r e a s u r y  and Civil 
S e rv ic e  Committee have shown con sid erab le  in te re s t  s ince  th e  la t te r  
part of 1983.
(v ii)  C onsideration by th e  House of Lords S e le c t  Committee on the
European Communities. The term s of re fe re n c e  of th is  Committee 
are  d if fe re n t  from , and wider th a n ,  th ose  of the equivalent Commons 
Committee: "to  co n s id er  Community p rop osa ls ,  w heth er in d ra ft  or
o th erw ise , obtain  all n e c e s s a ry  information about them , and rep o rt  
on those  w hich , in the opinion of the Committee, ra ise  im portant 
qu estions  of policy or princip le  and on o th e r  qu estions  to which
the Committee con sid er  th at  th e  special a tten tion  of the House 
should be d r a w n . . . " .  T he D raft T re a ty  is c lear ly  within th e  Term s 
of re fe re n c e  of the Lords' Committee; and the Committee, and 
individual members of i t ,  have a lready been involved in deciding 
how b est  to p ro ceed , and are  at th e  time of w riting ( Ja n u a r y  1985) 
involved in f u r th e r  s te p s .



























































































The Committee is e x p e c te d  to decide in late Ja n u a r y  or early  
F e b ru a ry  1985 w hether to set up an ad hoc Committee on the Draft 
T re a ty  ( 'ad  h o c 1 b ecau se  the D raft T re a ty  does not fall neatly  into 
one of the Lords' Sub-Com m ittee c a te g o r ie s ) .  Members of the 
Committee are  to visit the In stitu tion a l A ffa irs  Committee of the 
European Parliament in F e b r u a r y .  EP M em bers, in tu r n ,  will be in 
th e  UK in April 1985 as p art  of th e ir  g en era l to u r  to each national 
P arliam ent.
Section  3 : The Political P arties
As mentioned in the In tro d u ctio n ,  we have been unable to id en tify  
any su b stan t ia l  body of opinion in the UK, outside th e  Alliance 
p a rt ies  (L ib era ls  and Social D em ocrats) ,  which fav o u rs  th e  Draft 
T re a ty  or  is even p rep ared  to take  it se r io u s ly .  A v e ry  good 
in d icator  of the importance a ttach ed  by  a B r i t is h  political p a r ty  
to a p a r t icu la r  issue  in any y e a r  is its  place in the agenda of the 
P a rty  C onference  in Sep tem ber/ O cto ber . In 1984, even th e  L ib era l 
P a r ty ,  the most e n th u sias tic  for  the Union, only held a debate  on 
the '1984 Euro E le c t io n s '.  T he motion for  debate  lamented the 
p a r ty 's  p erform an ce, along with th at of its  SDP Alliance p a r tn e r ,  
in the EP e le c tio n s ; and was h igh ly  c r i t ic a l  of its  EP p a r tn e rs  in 
the Federation  of European L ib era ls  and Democrats (E L D ).  T h e re  
was hard ly  a mention of the D raft T r e a ty .
(a )  The C onservative  P arty
As the p a r ty  of governm ent, having no need to tak e  account of any 
coalition co n s id e ra t io n s ,  th e  a tt i tu d e  of the C o n se rv a tiv e s  is 
c ru c ia l  for  at least the n e x t  th re e  y e a r s .  It  i s ,  how ever, 
n e c e s s a ry  to d is t in g u ish  'th e  governm ent' from th e  C on serv ativ e  
p a r ty  at la rge  in the UK; and to d is t in g u ish  both from 
C on servative  MEPs.
The a tt i tu d es  of the C on serv ativ e  P a rty  as a whole have been 
summarized by  th e  P a r ty 's  R e s e a rc h  Departm ent as follows:



























































































F ir s t ly ,
"T h e re  is  a b elie f  that the time is not ripe for  European 
Union, a lthough th is  does not diminish th e  support in princip le  
for  the g en era l idea in due c o u r s e " (u n d erlin ing  a d d e d ) .
Su ch  qu alif ications speak volumes. T he p ro je c t  is firmly in the 
ca te g o ry  of 'not for  tod ay1 ! Seco n d ly ,
"T h e re  is the s tro n g ly  held view th a t ,  s ince  th e  UK has an 
unw ritten  constitu tion  unlike most of th e  r e s t  of our Community 
p a r t n e r s , . . .  an 'evolutionary ' p ro ce ss  tow ards European Union 
is more d es irab le  than a 'rev o lu tion ary ' approach  (b y  means of 
a T r e a t y ) " .
Whilst the line of reasoning h e re  may not be obv iou s, it p robably  
r e f le c ts  unease  th at th ere  would be no constitu tional 'bulw ark ' 
again st p ro g re s s iv e  erosion of UK 's o v e re ig n ty ' .
Many of th e se  re s e rv a t io n s  are  sh ared  b y  sev era l C on serv ativ e  
MEPs. T h is  is so despite  th e  votes  c a s t  in favour of the D raft 
T re a ty  by  many of them . (T h e  group voted on 14 F e b ru a ry  1984: 
22 in fa v o u r ,  5 a b s te n t io n s ,  6 a g a in s t ,  28 not v o t in g ) .  A free  
vote was allowed despite  a c e r ta in  amount of re s is ta n c e  to it by 
P arty  m anagers b a ck  home. 'E xplan ation s of vote ' followed soon 
a f t e r .  A fa ir ly  typ ica l example of the t ru e  meaning of a vote in 
fav ou r came from C h ris to p h e r  J a c k s o n ,  MEP :
U ndoubtedly some of the ideas in th e  d ra ft  t r e a ty  are  
c o n tro v e rs ia l ,  for  example its  recommendations con cern in g  the 
v e to . I was among those  who voted for  th e  d ra f t  as d eserv in g  
f u r th e r  d iscu ssion  yet made c le ar  the im portance th ey  a ttach  to 
th e  continuation  of the veto  . . . [ 1 7 ]
At the time of th e  free  vote in the EP (14 F e b ru a ry  1984) D erek 
P r a g ,  MEP, explained th e  EDG's s tan ce  th u s  :
T he e s se n tia l  d if fe re n ce  within th e  group -  and it is a fa ir  
and legitim ate d if fere n ce  to anyone who knows the h is to ry  both 
of the United Kingdom and of Denmark -  is betw een those  who 
believe th at  w ritten  tre a t ie s  a re  n e c e s s a ry  in a vo lu ntary  
union or community of peoples and those  who believe in organic  
developm ent, the evolutionary  p r o c e s s ,  gradualism and 
pragm atism . [18]



























































































T h u s ,  if th e re  appears  to be a d eg ree  of am biguity about 
C on serv ativ e  a tt i tu d es  to the D raft T re a ty  at p r e s e n t ,  it is not 
one which a ffo rd s  much comfort to the T r e a t y 's  prom oters . An 
House of Commons vote on th e  D raft T re a ty  will see most 
C o n serv a tiv es  vote as as th e y  are  told b y  th e  p a r ty  m anagers -  
re f le c t in g  th e  Ministerial views a lread y  qu oted . A few would 
b re a k  r a n k s ;  ra th e r  more might a b sta in .
(b )  The Labour P arty
A ccording to a P arty  R e s e a rc h  O ff ice r ,  the L ab ou r P a rty  has  "to  the 
b e s t  of my knowledge . . . n e v e r  made a formal statem ent on the 
question of European U nion". Commenting on th e  ab se n ce  of 
su b stan t ia l  docum entation, he added "T h a t  might of i ts e l f  be a 
s ign ifican t re flection  of th e  im portance a ttach ed  to the issue by 
the Labour P a r t y " .
T h e re  ap p ears  to be no g reat  d if fe re n ce  betw een the P a r ty 's  s tan ce  
in the EP and its  s tan ce  at home; and no likelihood of Labour 
sup portin g  the Draft T r e a t y .  At Community le v e l,  in the 1984 
Manifesto of th e  C onfederation of th e  Socia list P a r t ie s ,  Labour 
en te re d  a re s e r v e  s ta tin g  th at it "did not su p p o rt"  the sect ion s  on 
'In s titu t io n a l improvements in fav ou r of the EP' and 'An improved 
financial sy s te m '.  Labou r is also ab se n t from the Annex d eclarin g  
PSI and PSDI support for  the D raft T r e a t y .  [19]
In d eed , L ab o u r 's  own national Manifesto for  th e  1984 European 
e lections was care fu l to leave open the 'withdrawal' option . I t  
s ta ted  th at
[EEC] ru le s  may s tan d  in the way of a L ab ou r Governm ent when it 
a c ts  to cut unemployment. It  is  in th is  c o n te x t  th at  we 
believe th at B r i ta in ,  like all member s ta te s ,  must re ta in  the 
option of withdrawal from the EEC .



























































































T his  is of co u rse  a care fu l compromise: but th e  compromise
op erates  in r e v e r s e  as well. T hose  most in favou r of 
' fu l l -h e a r te d ' UK membership of the EC do not wish to exp ose  
them selves too fa r  by any open support for  the D raft T r e a ty .
(c )  T he L ib era l P arty
The L ib era ls  have been unequivocal in th e ir  sup port for  th e  Draft 
T r e a t y .  T h ey  h a v e ,  how ever, no voice in the EP and only a v e ry  
small voice in th e  UK House of Commons. From th e ir  point of view, 
much the most promising place in which to f ig h t fo r  a debate  on the 
D raft T re a ty  is the House of L o rd s . T h ey  have more r e p r e s e n ­
ta t iv es  th e re  (including such  'e ld er  statesm en ' as Lord G ladw yn), 
numerous and often  influential SDP a ll ies ,  and independent 
'c ro s s b e n c h '  sy m p ath ise rs .  A debate  in th e  House of Lords could 
be no more than  an attempt to 'show the f la g ' ,  u n d ertak en  without 
any exp ecta tio n  th at  a majority for  the D raft T re a ty  in the Lords 
( i ts e l f  u n lik ely ) could 'shame' th e  Commons into agreem en t.
The 'L ib era l Programme for  Europe' (1983) declared  "We have been 
fully committed to the goal of Political and Economic Union for  the 
peoples of Europe since . . .  1958" .  The document closed by 
em phasising "th e  importance of working tow ards European fed era t ion "  
b u t ,  p erh ap s  s ig n if ica n tly ,  it did not mention th e  Spinelli 
proposals  which were due for  debate  in th e  European Parliament 
immediately a f te r  its  publication .
T he n e x t  s tep  was the d ra ft in g  of the jo in t L ib e ra l-S D P  Alliance 
Manifesto for  the 1984 EP e le c tio n s . In C h ap ter  VI ( 'A n E ffe c t iv e  
Democratic E u ro p e ')  the p a rt ies  had an op p ortu nity  to 'go firm' on 
th e  D raft T r e a t y .  T h ey  did n o t.  In d eed , one person  activ e ly  
involved in th e  d raft in g  had the im pression th a t ,  even at th is  
level of a tten tion  and a w are n e ss ,  almost no-one had heard  of the 
D raft T r e a t y .  C hapter VI i tse lf  is delphic at c ru c ia l  p o in ts :



























































































We want to stream line the Community's s t r u c tu r e  and its  methods 
of decis ion-m akin g . T h is  can be done without chan ging  the 
T re a t ie s  . . .
The use of the veto  in the Council, must be s e v e re ly  r e s t r ic te d  
. . . Alliance MEPs will seek  to join with like-m inded MEPs . . .  
in the con stru ction  of an e v e r -c lo s e r  union among th e  peoples 
of E u r o p e . [20]
Equally s ign ifican t was the ab se n ce  of debate  on the D raft T re a ty  
at the P a r ty 's  Assembly in the late summer of 1984. Attention was 
focu ssed  in stead  on the P a r ty 's  unhappy re la tio n s  with th e  ELD, and 
its  delicate  re la tions with the B r i t is h  SD P, to which we now tu r n .
(d )  The Social Democrats
Michael G allagher of th e  SDP was the sole Alliance MEP until Ju n e  
1984. Voting for th e  D raft T r e a t y ,  he sa id ,
I wish to put it beyond doubt th at  the Alliance is solidly 
behind the development of European co -o p era tio n  along the lines 
se t  out in th is  prelim inary d ra ft  t r e a t y ' .
P ar ty  so u rces  have in d ica ted , h ow ever, th at  th ey  have been u n d er 
lit t le  p r e s s u re  so fa r  to ju s t i fy  th e ir  position on the D raft 
T r e a t y ,  although th ey  have on occasion been a ttack ed  by  the 
C o n se rv a tiv e s  about i t .  It  has caused  some, th ou g h  not s e r io u s ,  
s tra in  in th e ir  re la tions with the L ib e ra ls .  T h e re  is more than  a 
hint of d if fe re n ce  in th e  ap p ro ach es  of some of the SD P 's  own 
le a d e r s .
The genera lly  favourab le  orientation  of th e  SDP should not conceal 
two qu alif ica tion s. F i r s t ,  Dr David Owen (now le ad e r  of the 
p a r ty )  is c lear ly  less  en th u s ia s t ic  about the D raft  T re a ty  than 
e ith e r  the L ib era ls  or h is  own p re d e c e s s o r ,  Mr. Roy J e n k in s .  
S eco n d , the SDP is not at all likely  to exp ose  i ts e l f  to any 
political r i s k ,  or  'h igh profile ' in fav o u r  of th e  D raft T r e a t y .
It  is re g ard e d  as a good idea in the long term , but at p re se n t  as a 
'n o n -s ta r te r '  in UK term s.



























































































On the v e to ,  the SD P 's  co n s is te n t  line has  been to arg u e  for  
redu ction  r a th e r  than  abolition; th ey  succeed ed  in g ett ing  th is  
w ritten  into th e  Alliance m anifesto. Beyond th is ,  th e re  has been 
no detailed statem ent th at can be re g ard e d  a s . au th o rita tiv e  since 
an artic le  by  Mr Je n k in s  in The Guardian in 1982.
Section 4 : In te r e s t  Groups
(a) The C onfederation of B r i t is h  In d u stry  ( " C B I " ) :
The C BI has n o t,  to d a te ,  produced any detailed reaction  to the 
D raft T r e a t y ,  and does not ap p ear to have plans to do so . I t s  
reactio n s  to p a r ts  of the Draft T r e a t y ,  and to its  gen era l t h r u s t ,  
may be in fe rre d  from such  documents as th e  1983 C on feren ce  note , 
'Making the EC Work B e t t e r :  Managing R e c o v e ry ' ;  and more especia lly  
th e  sh o rt  pamphlet issued  ju s t  b efore  the 1984 EP e le c t io n s ,
'Making Europe Work B e t te r :  how MEPs can help B r i t is h  B u s in e s s ' .  
Under th e  h ead in g , 'No to a tw o -t ie r  Community', th e  C BI s a y s :  
. . .u n i f i c a t io n  of the in tern a l m a rk e t . . .  must be the major 
policy o b je c t iv e .  Proposals  for  a Community policy which 
would divide the Member S ta te s  into t w o . . . a r e  in co n s is ten t with 
th is  o b jec t iv e  and must be opposed.
And on decision-m aking :
B e t te r  decision-m aking will not be achieved without moving 
tow ards m ajority voting where the T re a ty  [of Rome] allows i t . 
In s is te n c e  on unanimity for  e v e ry th in g  b locks  p ro g re s s  towards 
a tru e  common m a rk e t . '
The C B I 's  in s is te n c e  was on th orou gh  consultation  in e ar ly  s tag e s  
of Community legislation ( " T h e r e  must be no re c u r r e n c e  of the 
'V redelin g  ra b b it '  pulled out of a hat . . . " ) .  Heavy emphasis was 
placed on th e  completion and simplification of the in tern a l m arket, 
ending n o n - ta r i f f  b a r r ie r s  and e s tab lish in g  full l ibera lisa tion  for 
s e r v ic e s .  On many individual p o l ic y -a re a s ,  the C B I said th in g s  
v e ry  similar to th e  D raft T r e a t y ,  but its  complete s ilence  on the 
D raft T re a ty  i tse lf  indicated th e  C BI view th at it should be



























































































possib le  to accomplish most th at is d es ired  th ro u g h  the ex is t in g  
T r e a t ie s ,  with only piecemeal ch a n g e .  T h e re  is no indication th at 
the C BI in tend s to make th e  D raft T re a ty  a major is s u e ,  or th at it 
is p rep ared  to go to the b a rr ic a d e s  or push the Government on 
behalf  of i t .
(b )  The In s t i tu te  of D ir e c to r s .
The a tti tu d e  of the B r i t is h  In s t i tu te  of D irec tors  v e ry  c losely  
parallels  th at  of the C B I and th ose  of o th e r  em ployers' o rg a n is ­
ations in the Community. In its  subm ission to th e  incoming 
Commission [21] ( Ja n u a r y  1 9 8 5 ) ,  th e  In s t i tu te  se t  th e  achievem ent 
of a 'genuine common m arket' fo r  goods, s e rv ic e s  and t ra n sp o r t  as 
the ov errid in g  p r io r i ty ,  to be achieved by 1988, and warned of the 
ir re v e r s ib le  sh ift  in the economic c e n tre  of g ra v ity  to th e  Pacific  
rim.
The In s t i tu te  warned sp ecifica l ly  again st allowing any ta lk  of a 
D raft T re a ty  for  European Union to d is tra c t  from th is  immediate, 
p ractica l  and p rio r ity  ta s k .  In te r e s t in g ly ,  how ever, the 
In s t i tu te  was p rep ared  to en v isag e  suspen sion  of th e  r ig h t  of veto 
in the Council of M in isters , bu t on proposals  "which are  c lear ly  
designed  only to develop the in tern a l m a rk e t" :  a formula close to
th at of the C BI quoted above .
(c )  The T ra d e s  Union C o n g ress  ( " T . U . C . " )
The TUC h a s ,  at the time of w rit in g , not y e t  d iscu sse d  the Draft 
T re a ty  in G eneral C ouncil, and th u s  has  no formal 'co rp o rate '  
view. It  is c le ar  h o w ever, th at  the TUC has 'no love for 
S p in e lli ' ,  though it is qu ite  fav ou rab ly  disposed to cer ta in  
specific  o rien ta tion s  of th e  D raft T r e a ty .
The a tt i tu d es  rep orted  h e re  are  th e re fo re  those  of TUC r e s e a r c h e r s ,  




























































































whom have not..  T h ey  are  in favour of re ta in in g  'unanimous 
v o t in g ' ,  i . e .  the veto . T h ey  are  again st th e  gran t of additional 
powers to the EP in g e n era l.  T h ey  do not fav ou r notions of 
d efen ce  and s e c u r ity  policy at Union le v e l.  T h ey  respond 'more 
positively ' to political co -o p e ra t io n ,  and feel th e re  should be 
'more of i t ' ,  without sp ecify in g  the m ech anics . C o-op erative  
(p lu ri-n a tio n a l)  in d u str ia l  p ro je c ts  are  viewed as 'v e ry  important 
to u s ' ,  as is the ex ten sio n  of policy in the social f ie ld , 
p articu lar ly  as c o n ce rn s  w orkers ' r ig h ts  and cond ition s. However, 
th ey  qu estion  w heth er a chan ge in the in st itu tion a l a rran g em en ts  is 
needed to g e n e ra te  the political will to c a r r y  th ro u g h  such  
polic ies . T h ey  n o te , with d is s a t is fa c t io n ,  th at  th e  'prim acy of 
the CAP' is not called into qu estion  in th e  D raft T r e a ty .
Section  5: The European Movement
We have s t r e s s e d  the s tr ik in g  lack  of position of many UK bodies on 
th e  D raft T re a ty  at the time of w ritin g . Much the same could have 
been said b e fo re  the referend um  on 'ren e g o tia t io n ' :  th e  re la tiv e ly
h igh  tu rn -o u t  of v o te rs  was due in no small part to 'p rop agan d ­
is in g ' g ro u p s ,  for  and a g a in s t .  The European Movement acted  th e n ,  
and would p robably  act a g a in , as a main umbrella organ isation  for 
those wishing to 'go fo rw ard '.  It  is an in te r -p a r t y  b od y, drawing 
sup port from as wide a spectrum  as p o ss ib le ,  as is well re f le c te d  
in its  lis t  of o f f i c e - b e a r e r s ,  p a tro n s  and p re s id e n ts .  I t  is 
n o tab le ,  h ow ever, th at it can count on few prominent Labour 
f ig u r e s ,  mainly from the r ig h t  of th e  p a r ty .
The European Movement has ov er  th ir ty  'A ssociated  O rg a n isa t io n s ',  
se v era l  of which have a d eg ree  of in flu ence  o v e r  policy in one or 
o th e r  of th e  political p a r t ie s .  I t  h a s ,  more than any o th e r  body 
in th e  UK, given both prom inence and a re la t iv e ly  positive p re s s  to 
the D raft T r e a t y .  (S u b s ta n t ia l  a r t ic le s  b y ,  for  exam ple, Dr Roy 
P ry ce  (M arch-A pril  1984) and Mr D erek Prag ( Ju ly -A u g u s t  1984) have 
e n s u re d ,  at le a s t ,  th at none of th ese  A ssociated O rganisations has 
any e x c u s e  fo r  not having con sid ered  th e  D raft T re a ty  ra th e r  
fu l ly ) .



























































































It  remains the case  th at  the European Movement to date has not been 
galvanised  into action on behalf  of the D raft T r e a t y .  It  p ro v ed , 
o v er  the 1975 re feren d u m , a h igh ly  e f fe c t iv e  body once e n g ag ed ; 
and it might do so aga in . Without i t ,  c e r ta in ly ,  the D raft T re a ty  
would have much less  of an audience and le ss  e x p o su re  in the UK.
Section  6 : The Media
The B r i t is h  media gave the D raft T re a ty  th e ir  u su al,  sp o rad ic ,  
a t te n tio n .  T his  can be gauged from the P re s s  : th ere  were 
f lu r r ie s  of in te re s t  in Septem ber 1983 and F e b ru a ry  1984 when the 
votes were due. Even th ese  were mainly confined  to the 'quality ' 
n ew sp ap ers ,  whose reaction  might b e s t  be d e scr ib e d  as d ark ly  
sc e p tic a l .  L a te r ,  th ey  ignored  i t .  The popular P r e s s ,  when it 
did not simply ignore  the D raft T r e a t y ,  was s c a th in g .
'V is ion ary ' was p robably  the commonest of the polite e p ith e ts  used 
to d e sc r ib e  the T r e a ty .  F i r s t ,  some exam ples from the Times and 
the Guardian beg inn ing  in Sep tem ber 1983:
The v i s i o n . . .will be one s tep  n e a re r  re a l i ty .  E xcep t th at  it 
will not hap pen . Not in the n e x t  couple of y e a rs  and p robably  
not for  many more y e a rs  to c o m e . . . .  Tomorrow's p ro p o s a ls . .  .h av e  
simply become w orthy attem pts to keep  the idea of u n ity  alive 
amid the yawns of the public and most p o lit ic ian s. [22]
The d ra ft  t r e a ty  will p rob ab ly  remain for  many y e a rs  little
more than  a th eo re t ica l  nudge in the d irection  of u n i t y ..........
National govern m en ts . . .a r e  in no mood for  handing o v er  
s ign ifican t powers to a sup ranational b od y. [23]
Fed eral union likely  to remain ju s t  a v is ion . [24]
[I ] ts  ch a n ce s  of being implemented in th e  fore se e ab le  fu tu re  
are  remote in the e x tre m e. T he Parliam ent re co g n ised  th is  in 
ag ree in g  to send its  resolution  d ire c t  to the 10 national 
parliam ents for  co n s id e ra t io n , r a th e r  than  sending it to the



























































































Council of M inisters . . .  Sev era l c o u n tr ie s ,  including B r ita in ,  
would c e r ta in ly  veto any proposal which would do away with the 
r ig h t  to a v e t o . [25]
The Economist was a lit tle  more p osit iv e . I t s  headline (18/2/84) 
read
"T h e  EEC speeds up from a snail 's  pace to a c ra w l."
I f  B r i t is h  a tt i tu d es  are  hard  to u n d e rs ta n d , it should not be 
fo rg o tten  th at th is  is the diet on which 'informed' opinion has 
been fed .
The F inancial Times was k in d e r ,  but still tended to play down the 
p ra c t ica l  im portance and likelihood of implementation of th e  D raft 
T r e a ty .  It  is p erh ap s  worth quoting at g r e a te r  len g th  as a fa ir ly  
a c c u ra te  re flec tio n  of sym pathetic but agn ostic  opinion in th e  U K :-  
T he Draft T re a ty  is a political statem ent and not a b lueprin t 
which pu ts  th e  Community in imminent d an g er  of fundamental 
c h a n g e .  Governm ents are  not even obliged to tak e  much notice  
of i t ,  a lthou gh it is to be subm itted to national parliam ents 
for r a t i f ic a t io n . . . .
B u t its  actu al re lev an ce  is more likely  to d erive  from the way 
it feed s into the growing debate  ov er  how to make the Community 
more e f fe c t iv e  -  or r a th e r ,  how to p r e s e rv e  it from impotence 
and d is a r r a y .  . . .
[T ] h e  d ra f t  t r e a t y ..........g ives  some e x p re ss io n  to popular demands
for  a more e f fe c t iv e  Community. [26]
Section  7 :  Public Opinion
In the light of th e  fo reg o in g , it might be e x p e c te d  th at public 
opinion in th e  UK would be u n iv ersa lly  hostile  to D raft T r e a ty .  
U n fo rtu n ate ly , most of the qu estion s  posed in leading s u rv e y s  are  
not of a form to enable  us to say  w heth er  th is  is so or n o t.  The 
ev idence  is b e s t  d e scr ib e d  a s ,  f i r s t ,  in conclu sive  an d , seco n d , 
p a ra d o x ic a l .



























































































As was pointed out by  the t i re le s s  Mr. P ra g ,  the Eurobarom etre  poll 
c a rr ie d  out in O ctober 1983 in the UK, indicated th at 70% of those 
questioned were 'in fav ou r of th e  u nification of w estern  E u ro p e . '  
F u r th e r ,  th is  p ercen tag e  has not dropped much below 60 in the y e a rs  
th at the polls have been c a rr ie d  o u t ,  w hatever th e  s ta te  of opinion 
at the time about th e  Common M arket. T he d iff icu lty  with such  
qu estion s  is obviou s: th ey  are  so vague and h ig h -so u n d in g  th at to
oppose them is akin to opposing v ir tu e .  T h ey  in no way evaluate  
views con cern in g  th e  form and scope of 'union' nor what 
in terv iew ees would be p rep ared  to forego  to a tta in  cer ta in  
o b je c t iv e s .
It  is possible  to make much or l i t t le ,  in re g a rd  to the D raft 
T r e a ty 's  p ro s p e c ts ,  of su ch  data as the O ctob er  1983 Eurobarom etre  
stu d y (p u b lish ed  Decem ber 1 9 8 3 ) .  T he gen era l p ic tu re  was a 
somewhat more positive (o r  at le a s t  le ss  n e g a t iv e )  a tt i tu d e  toward 
the European Community in th e  UK in 1982 and 1983 ( a f te r  something 
of a nad ir  in 1980/81). T h is  gen era l p ic tu re  em erges from the 
th re e  'b a s ic '  qu estion s  re g u la r ly  a s k e d . [27]
Narrowing down to the role of the European P arliam ent, E u ro b aro ­
metre indicated  m id d le -o f- th e -ra n g e  views in th e  UK about the 
p re s e n t  e f fe c t iv e n e s s  of th e  E P , and a fa ir ly  s ig n ifican t sh ift  
between April and O ctob er  1983 in favou r of an in cre a se  in its  role 
in fu tu re .
of EP should b e - April 1983 % O ctob er
More 34 48
Less 27 20
About same 20 17
Don't know 19 15
A gain, th is  question in no way in v es t ig a te d  th e  problem s of 
modality, q u id -p ro -q u o ,  implied 'c o s ts '  and c o n se q u en ces  from the 
UK's point of view. T he newly in trodu ced  q u estio n s  in the 1983 
s u rv e y  sought to exp lore  'what so r t  of EP for  what sort  of Europe' 
-  th u s  edging c lo ser  to th e  is su e s  which the D raft T re a ty  se ek s  to 
a d d re s s ,  but still  ev idence  o f ,  at b e s t ,  an in d irec t  and unreliab le



























































































k in d . T he th re e  qu estions  sou ght to ev a lu a te :  a) the EP 's  
tech n ica l fu n ct io n :  its  powers to control the way the Community
fu n ction s  and the b u d g et ;  b )  its  perce ived  rem oteness from 
people 's  problem s; c )  i ts  'co n st itu e n t '  role -  how fa r  th e  new 
(p o s t-1 9 8 4 )  EP should 'work tow ards a political union of member 
c o u n tr ie s ,  with a European Government re sp o n sib le  to the E P '.
In b r ie f ,  E u ro b aro m etre 's f ind ings h e re  were th at th e  UK was th ird  
lowest on th e  'enhanced contro l '  q u estio n , but not by v e ry  much; 
was h ig h e s t  of th e  'rem oteness from people 's  problem s' q u estio n ; 
and was m id d le-o f-th e  ran g e  in d eg ree  of positive sup port for  a 
'co n s t itu e n t '  role for  the EP (Y e s  60%; No 18%; Don't Know 22%).
D irect e lection s were p erce ived  as an 'ev en t with im portant 
co n se q u en ces ' b y  44% of th e  UK 1983 sample, a modest decline from 
47% in the period 1976/78; th is  again put the UK in the middle of 
th e  r a n g e ,  and was one of th e  smallest lo sse s  of su p p o rt .  One 
reason  for sceptic ism  about th e  data is th e  famous 'p ro p e n sity  to 
vote ' q u estio n . R esp o n ses  th at  in terv iew ees  were 'ce r ta in '  or 
'p rob able ' to vote were used as a p re d ic to r  of the level of actual 
tu rn o u t :  the UK p e rce n ta g e  of 'ce r ta in  + p robable ' was said to be
69% -  h a rd ly ,  in th e  lig ht of e v e n ts ,  th e  'ex ce llen t in d icator  of 
voting p ro p en sity ' claimed by  Eurobarom etre  [ 28] ,
One might indeed point to th e  dismal level of tu rn o u t in th e  1984 
EP e lection s as a b e t te r  indication of public opinion. But it may 
be replied  th at th is  in part r e f le c ts  disillusion with e x a c t ly  the 
shortcom ings to which the D raft T re a ty  a d d re s s e s  i t s e l f ;  th is  too 
ap p ears  u n con v in cin g .
T he basic  point is that most -  even supposedly  'w ell-inform ed' -  
people in the UK have so fa r  not even h eard  of the D raft T r e a t y ;  
still  few er have the s l ig h te s t  notion of i ts  c o n te n t ,  s ta tu s  or 
m odalities. And if th ese  were conveyed  to them in the form of 
su ch  q u estio n s  as 'Would you fav ou r th e  ending of th e  UK veto ? ' ,  
or in term s of taxation  pow ers , th e re  is  lit t le  doubt what the 
answ ers  would b e .




























































































On p re se n t  e v id en ce , th e re  is no p ro sp e c t  of th e  UK House of 
Commons voting in favou r of the D raft T re a ty  in th is  Parliam ent. 
The likelihood of the House of Lords doing so is g r e a te r ,  but not 
much g r e a te r ,  than zero , T he Prime M in ister 's  personal opposition 
to su ch  notions is le g e n d a ry .
It is ju s t  conceivable  th at  the issu e  could a r ise  in the event of 
an inconclu sive  re su lt  at the n e x t  G eneral E lec tio n . But th is  too 
is most u n lik ely . Only if one or  both of th e  Alliance p arties  
(im probably but s u c c e ss fu l ly )  made it a condition fo r  participation  
in a pact with an o th er  p a r ty ;  or i f ,  aga in st  p re s e n t  ev id e n ce , the 
Alliance p a rt ies  were to make sweeping g a in s ,  might th is  hap pen .
It is fa ir  to point out th at an e x tr a  10%, s a y ,  of the popular vote 
would have produced su ch  gains fo r  the Alliance at th e  last 
e lec tio n . It  is fa ir  to re p ly  th at  even in an e lection  whose 






















































































































































































PART I I I :  PERSONAL ASSESSMENT
The a tti tu d e  of the United Kingdom must seem, and indeed i s ,  v e ry  
d isco u ra g in g . B u t th e  prom oters of the D raft T r e a ty  should 
p erh ap s  b e a r  th ree  th in g s  in mind.
First), membership of th e  Community was "sold" to the B r i t is h  public 
prim arily as an economic b e n e f i t .  T he political ad v an tag es  of 
European in tegra tion  were -  p erh ap s  wisely at the time -  u n d e r­
p lay ed , e x ce p t  to sop h istica ted  a u d ie n ce s . B r i t is h  access io n  was 
followed almost immediately b y  s e v ere  economic d e p re ss io n ; and the 
problems of adapting to a completely new ty p e  of political and 
jud icia l system  -  " fo re ig n "  in e v e ry  sen se  to B r i t is h  
p recon cep tion s  and ways of working -  were a c u te .  The re s u lt  is 
th at  the Community ideal has failed to ca p tu re  th e  B r i t is h  
imagination and , more fundam entally , th a t  c lo se r  political 
in tegra tion  is not seen  as th e  n atu ra l development of th e  e x is t in g  
Communities.
Secon d , the fact  th at th e  United Kingdom does not have a w ritten  
co n st i tu t io n , and seems to have no m achinery fo r  en tren ch m en t of 
t re a ty  ob ligat ion s , is in d icative  of an im portant fe a tu re  of the 
B r i t is h  temperament and outlook. T h e re  is l i t t le  aw areness  of 
" th e  s ta te "  or its  " in s t i tu t io n s " .  P erso nal loyalty  is more to 
th e  person  of th e  monarch th an  to th e  m onarchy as s u c h .  Most 
c it izen s  are  fa r  more aware of th e  fact  th at  th e y  are  E n g lish ,  
S co tt ish  or (d esp ite  p artit ion )  I r i s h  than  th at  th e y  are  B r i t is h  or 
th at th ey  are  c it izen s  of 'the  United Kingdom1 (w hich is h ard ly  
more than  a term of a r t  for  th e  p u rp oses  of in tern atio n a l 
re la t io n s ) .  T h e re  is an innate  p re fe re n c e  for  allowing 
in st itu tion s  to develop, as th e  fa ilu re  of all a ttem pts rad ica lly  
to reform  the second cham ber of Parliament ( th e  House of L o rd s)  
show s. T he idea th at  im portant political end s can be ach ieved  by 
cre a t in g  new in s t itu t io n s ,  and th e  symbolic s ig n ifican ce  of 
cre a t in g  them , are  not re g a rd e d  as s e l f -e v id e n t .
T h ird ,  th e  B r i t is h  approach  to leg islation  and , in th e  commercial 
f ie ld , to the making of c o n tra c ts  involves  looking ca re fu lly  at the 
"small p r in t"  and leaving as lit tle  to ch an ce  as p o ss ib le .  E v e ry



























































































fo reseeab le  ev en tu a lity  must be provided for  in ad v a n ce .  T h e re  is 
th e re fo re  an in h e re n t unw illingness to ag re e  the p rin c ip les  and 
allow th e  details  to look a f te r  th em selves . T he c lose atten tion  
a lready given by  the U .K .  governm ent to the. small prin t of the 
D raft T re a ty  is simply a n atu ra l in s t in c t .  And it has not gone 
unnoticed th a t ,  when politicians in o th e r  co u n tr ie s  have e x p re s s e d  
enthusiasm  for  the European Union, the small p rin t  of th e ir  
sp eech es  conta ins  many of the same re s e rv a t io n s  on essen tia l  
p o in ts .
We do not th e re fo re  find it s u rp r is in g  th at the B r i t is h  a tti tu d e  to 
th is  D raft T r e a t y ,  coming at th is  time, is  n e g a t iv e .  In d eed , we 
have seriou s re se rv a t io n s  of our own, which we mention in a moment. 
We do, on the o th er  h an d , d e tec t  a growing aw areness  -  at least 
amongst th ose  who are  d ire c t ly  involved -  of th e  u rg e n t  im portance 
of finding a way to make th e  Communities work b e t t e r ,  and of the 
b en e fits  th at  c lo se r  European in teg ra tion  can b r in g .  The 
a tt i tu d es  of th e  C BI and th e  In s t i tu te  of D irec to rs  rep o rted  in 
P art II are  p articu lar ly  s ig n ifican t in th is  r e s p e c t .
In sup port of the view th at  proposals for European Union could have 
th e  e f fe c t  of d ivertin g  a tten tion  from th e  u rg e n t  ta s k  of making 
the e x is t in g  Communities work b e t t e r ,  it can be arg u ed  th at the 
most s ig n ifican t s tep  tow ards in teg ra tion  of th e  United S ta te s  was 
n e ith e r  th e  Declaration of Ind epend en ce  nor th e  framing of the 
C on stitu t ion , but the decision in the "Steam ship  Monopoly Case" 
(G ibbons - v -  O g d en , 1824) when the Supreme C ourt f i r s t  applied the 
Commerce C lau se . In the Community we h a v e ,  as it w ere, s ta r te d  
with the Commerce C lau se . If_ the e x is t in g  Communities and th e ir  
in s t itu tio n s  a re  capable of being made to w ork, the p ractica l  
b e n e f its  seen  to be produced by  them would lead natu ra lly  to 
g r e a te r  enthusiasm  for  th e  n e x t  s tep  tow ards European Union. At 
th is  s ta g e ,  th e  European Union could simply be a new and unwelcome 
apple of d isco rd .



























































































For ou r own p a r t ,  we are  p a rt icu la r ly  co n cern ed  about fo u r  fe a tu re s  
of the Draft T re a ty
(i)  The proposed constitu tion  of th e  C ourt of J u s t ic e  of the 
European Union, and th e  e x e rc is e  of jud icia l co n tro l ;
(ii)  T he proposed con stitu tion  of the leg is la tu re  and , 
sp e c if ica l ly ,  the proposal for  a unicam eral Parliam ent;
(iii)  The e x te n t  to which th e  D raft T re a ty  prov id es fo r  the 
e f fe c t iv e  e x e rc is e  of e x e cu tiv e  power.
( iv )  T he d ro its  acqu is  of n o n -acce d in g  Member S ta te s .
THE COURT OF JU S T IC E
The Court of Ju s t ic e  (like  th e  Suprem e C ourt of the United S ta te s )  
has made a sp e c ta cu la r  con tribu tio n  to th e  p ro ce ss  of European 
in te g ra t io n .  One of the re a so n s  why it has b een  able to do so has 
been th at the o b je c ts  of th e  Communities a r e ,  in im portant 
r e s p e c t s ,  both  limited and c le ar ly  defined  by th e  T r e a t ie s .  In 
p a r t ic u la r ,  the EEC T re a ty  s e ts  out with some p recis ion  th e  ends to 
be achieved an d , e x p r e s s ly  or by im plication, th e  social and 
economic th eo ry  u nd erly ing  th e se  p re s c r ip t io n s .
The sp ecific  p re sc r ip t io n s  of th e  e x is t in g  T r e a t ie s ,  the doctr ine  
of d ire c t  e f fe c t  and th e  m achinery of A rticle  177 have all made it 
possible  for  the Court to t re a t  what a re  esse n tia l ly  social and 
economic is s u e s  as legal i s s u e s .  F u r th e r ,  th e  C ourt has  been 
a b le ,  on the b asis  of the T r e a t ie s ,  to define with some p recis ion  
the line of demarcation betw een th e  com petences of th e  Communities 
and those  of th e  Member S t a t e s .  We m ust, h o w ev er, qu estion  
w hether th is  dynamic role of th e  C ourt would have been to lerab le ,  
in B r i t is h  ey es  at le a s t ,  if  th e  ju r isd ic t io n  of the C ourt had not 
i tse lf  been  limited by th e  scope of the T r e a t ie s .
The D raft T re a ty  o f fe rs  no c le a r  definition of th e  ju r isd ic t io n  of 
the C o u rt ,  of the ends to be achieved  or of the u n d erly in g  social 
and economic th e o ry .  It  i s ,  at any r a t e ,  not c le a r  to  us which of 
the "P r in c ip le s"  of th e  EEC T r e a ty  ( f a r  le s s  th e  detailed  ru le s  of



























































































la te r  A rtic les )  are  to be re g ard e d  as " e x p r e s s ly  or implicitly 
amended by  th is  T re a ty "  (EUT A r t . 7 ( 2 ) ) .  To what e x te n t ,  for  
exam ple, could the leg is la tive  org an s  of the European Union 
lawfully adopt a d ir ig is te  competition policy in place of the 
e x is t in g  fre e  m arket policy , permit re s t r ic t iv e  trad in g  agreem ents  
or en cou rag e  th e  creation  of public or p riv ate  c a r te ls  or 
monopolies ?
The choice betw een a regu la ted  economy and a f re e  m arket economy is 
c lear ly  a political choice about w hich, as is e v id e n t ,  the 
governm ents of Member S ta te s  may d if fe r .  N e v e rth e le ss ,  fo r  the 
E E C , the choice has  been made in the T re a ty  and the C ourt can give 
e f fe c t  to th e  political choice by  applying the T r e a t y .  We do n o t,  
at th e  moment, see how the C ourt could do so if  it had f i r s t  to 
decide w heth er  or not the political choice had in fact  been made.
T he d if f icu lty  would be all th e  g re a te r  if  the C ourt were fo rced  to 
decide betw een the in te re s ts  of a m ajority of Member S ta te s  which 
had ra tif ied  the T re a ty  for the European Union and th ose  of a 
m inority which had n ot. S u p p o se , for  exam ple, th at a European 
Union co n s is t in g  of seven  of th e  ex is t in g  Member S ta te s  were to 
leg is la te  in fav ou r of g re a te r  s ta te  aids for  ailing in d u s tr ie s ,  
abandoning the s t r ic t  con tro ls  on s ta te  aids u n d er  the e x is t in g  
t r e a t ie s ;  and suppose th at th is  were ser iou sly  to a f fe c t  the 
com petitive position of u n d e rta k in g s  in th e  n o n -acced in g  Member 
S ta te s  who would (u n less  th ey  are  to be d eprived  of d ro its  a c q u is ) 
continue to be m em bers, to g e th e r  with the acced ing  m ajority , of the 
e x is t in g  Communities. Would th e  legislation of th e  European Union 
be lawful or not ?
It is not enough to say th at  th is  qu estion  would be decided by the 
C ourt of J u s t ic e  in the light of all the T r e a t ie s ,  s ince the 
qu estion  th en  is "Which C ourt of Ju s t ic e  ?" A rticle  30 of the 
D raft T re a ty  provides for  the reco n stitu tio n  of the Court of 
J u s t ic e  of the Communities u n d er  an organ ic  law of th e  European 
Union, and for  the appointment of at least half  of its  members by 
the Parliam ent. T hat being so , the Court of Ju s t ic e  of the



























































































European Union cannot be the same as the C ourt of J u s t ic e  of the 
Communities. Would the Court of J u s t ic e  of the Communities 
continue to e x is t  ? If  so , how would a conflic t  betw een th at 
Court and the new Court of the European Union be reso lved  ?
We o f fe r  th is  exam ple, not as a jurid ico -p h iloso p h ica l conundrum , 
but becau se  it seems to us to be a seriou s  p o ss ib ility  th at  a 
minority of the ex is t in g  Member S ta te s  would not be p rep ared  to 
ra t i fy  the D raft T r e a t y .  The problems cre a te d  by  su ch  a situation 
are  problems w hich, in our opinion, th e  prom oters of the Draft 
T re a ty  must face .
F u r th e r ,  even if all th e  e x is t in g  Member S ta te s  were to ra t i fy  the 
D raft T r e a t y ,  one must a sk  w h e th er ,  given the e x te n s iv e  com petence 
of the leg is la tive  org an s  of the European Union, the Court of 
Ju s t ic e  could continue to e x e rc is e  th e  same sort  of judicial 
contro l as it e x e r c is e s  at p r e s e n t .  As P ro fe s s o r  Ja c q u e  has 
pointed out in his G eneral R ep ort to th e  r e c e n t  FIDE C o n g ress  on 
"T h e  P rincip le  of Equ ality  in Economic Law" (page 1 6 ) ,  judicial 
control p re s e n ts  less  d iff icu lty  in th e  c o n te x t  of com petence liee 
than where a wide margin of appreciation  is le ft  to the 
adm inistration . While the point is not p re c ise ly  the same, th e re  
is a lready some ev idence  th a t ,  as th e  application of th e  e x is t in g  
T re a t ie s  p roceed s  f u r th e r  into the margin of ap p re c ia t io n ,  the 
Court f ind s it in cre a s in g ly  d iff icu lt  to be "a d v e n tu ro u s " .  One of 
the r e a s o n s ,  we would s u g g e s t ,  is th at jud icia l contro l m ust, if  it 
is to be a c c e p ta b le ,  i tse lf  be con tro lled .
THE PARLIAMENT
The Parliament env isaged  in th e  D raft T r e a ty  is a unicam eral 
Parliam ent, and it is proposed th at it should have leg is la tive  
pow ers. A bicameral le g is la tu re  is c h a r a c te r is t ic  of fed era l 
c o n s t i tu t io n s ,  and e x p e r ie n c e  shows th at a second Cham ber can play 
a valuable role in p re s e rv in g  th e  p recar io u s  equilibrium  of fed era l 
s t r u c t u r e s .



























































































It  has  been  su g g e sted  th at a bicameral le g is la tu re  is achieved for  
the European Union by  sh arin g  the leg is la tive  fun ction  betw een the 
Parliament and the Council -  the Parliament being th e  Lower Cham ber 
(o r  popular assem bly) whose will should ultimately p re v a il ,  and the 
Council the Upper Chamber re p re s e n t in g  th e  "re g io n s "  or "p ro v in ce s"  
( th e  Member S t a t e s ) .  It  seems to u s ,  h ow ever, th a t  th e  su g g e sted  
analogy betw een the leg is la t iv e  system  proposed in th e  D raft T re a ty  
and e x is t in g  bicameral le g is la tu re s  is unsound for  th re e  re a s o n s .
F i r s t ,  although A rticle  14 of the D raft T re a ty  p u rp o rts  to make the 
Parliament a popular assem bly of the trad ition al ty p e ,  its  
composition is le ft  to be determ ined la te r .  In th e  meanwhile,
" th e  p roced u re  [for  its  election] shall be th at  fo r  the election of 
th e  Parliament of the European Communities". T he s t r u c tu r e  of the 
ex is t in g  Parliament is re la ted  only in d ire c t ly  to th e  d is tr ibu tion  
of population and is weighted in fav ou r of th e  smaller Member 
S ta te s .  T he D raft T re a ty  o f fe r s  no gu aran tee  of chan ge  in th is  
re s p e c t  and it is most u n likely  th at  the smaller Member S ta te s  
would co n sen t to removal of th e  w eighting in th e ir  fa v o u r .  T h is  
is all th e  more improbable b ecau se  A rticle  22 of th e  Draft T re a ty  
provides for  voting in Council to be w eighted , as  at p r e s e n t ,  in 
fav ou r of th e  la r g e r  Member S ta te s .  "R egional" weighting in both 
Cham bers of th e  leg is la tu re  an d , in p a r t ic u la r ,  w eighting in favour 
of th e  smaller and le ss  powerful reg ion s  in th e  Lower C ham ber, and 
in fav ou r of th e  la r g e r  and more powerful reg io n s  in the U pper, is 
not found in any o th er  bicameral system  known to u s .
S e co n d , the Council i s ,  by  its  n a tu re ,  r e p re s e n ta t iv e  of governm ent 
-  of e x e c u tiv e  power. The in te r e s ts  of the e x e cu tiv e  org an s  of 
governm ent a re  not n e c e s s a r i ly ,  and c e r ta in ly  not alw ays, identical 
with the in te r e s ts  of the le g is la to r .  T h is  does not become any 
th e  less  t ru e  where the ex e cu tiv e  of the Member S ta te s  is given a 
leg is la t iv e  fun ction  within the wider co n tex t  of th e  Community, as 
e x p e r ie n c e  has  show n. In some bicam eral system s the members of 
the Upper Cham ber are  nominated or appointed b y  th e  e x e c u tiv e  ( e . g .  
Canada an d , to a large  e x te n t  de f a c t o , the United Kingdom ), but 
th is  is wholly d if fe re n t  from a system  in which the ex e cu tiv e  
i tse lf  perform s the leg is la t iv e  fun ction  of th e  Upper Cham ber.



























































































T h ir d ,  the Council does not re p r e s e n t  the " re g io n s"  or "p ro v in ce s"  
of th e  Community. It  r e p r e s e n ts  the c e n tra l  governm ents of ten  or 
twelve nation s ta te s  as th ey  happen to e x is t  in the late tw entieth  
c e n tu ry  a f te r  more than a millennium of h is to r ica l  developm ent.
Some s ta te s  can be said to re p r e s e n t  a s ingle  "people" or  at least 
a v irtu a lly  indissoluble union of peoples ; o th e rs  are  much more 
f is s i le .  In some s ta te s  governm ent has  become h igh ly  c e n tra lise d  
and is f re q u e n tly  c r it ic is e d  for  being in se n s it iv e  to the claims of 
th e  re g io n s ;  in o th e rs  a c a re fu l  balance  betw een th e  con flic tin g  
claims of th e  reg ion s is m aintained, e i th e r  formally or  by 
con v en tion , by the co nstitu tional system . T h e re  i s ,  at most, a 
limited value in com parisons betw een the nation s ta te s  of Europe 
and the s ta te s  or p rov in ces  of th e  United S t a t e s ,  A ustralia  or even 
Canada (p ro b ab ly  the c lo se s t  a n a lo g y ) .  T he European s itu a tio n , 
h isto r ica lly  and in o th e r  r e s p e c t s ,  is in fin ite ly  more com plex.
We th e re fo re  s u g g e st  th at  it is not p o ss ib le ,  even  th e o re t ic a l ly ,  
to ju s t i fy  th e  leg is la tive  system  proposed in th e  D raft T re a ty  by 
analogy with ex is t in g  bicam eral sy s te m s . The fa c t  th at the system  
proposed in th e  Draft T re a ty  is d if fe re n t  does n o t,  of c o u rse ,  
n e c e ssa r i ly  mean that it is a bad system . In any e v e n t ,  any 
proposal fo r  European Union m ust, if  it is to s tan d  any ch an ce  of 
s u c c e s s ,  reco g n ise  th e  claims to s o v e re ig n ty  of th e  European nation 
s ta te s  as th ey  e x is t .  F o r  th at  re a s o n ,  if  fo r  no o th e r ,  th ere  
must be a body such  as th e  Council having some power in re la tion  to 
leg is la t ion . B u t if the pu rp ose  of European Union is to move 
tow ards an Europe des p e u p le s , it seems su rp r is in g  th at th e  system  
proposed in the Draft T re a ty  would te n d ,  if a n y th in g ,  to e n tre n ch  
l 'Eu rope des e t a t s , s ince  it does nothing to re co g n ise  the 
u nd erly ing  d iv e rs ity  and asp ira tio n s  of the "p eop les"  who live 
within the political map. S e p a ra t is t  movements a lread y  e x is t  in 
se v era l  Member S ta te s  and th e  system  proposed in th e  D raft T r e a t y ,  
so fa r  from uniting p eop les ,  might only se rv e  to a g g ra v a te  th is  
t r e n d .
In th e  case  with which we are  most fam iliar, we cannot believe th at  
more than  five million S co ts  would be p rep ared  to accep t  a



























































































situation  in which th ey  were able to e lect only 8 members of the 
Lower Cham ber and had to re ly  on ce n tra l  governm ent in London to 
r e p re s e n t  th e ir  in te re s ts  in the Upper C ham ber, while smaller 
c o u n tr ies  had (actually  and/or p rop ortion ate ly )  much g re a te r  
re p re se n ta t io n  in the Lower Cham ber and sep ara te  re p re se n ta t io n  in 
the Upper C ham ber. We are  confident th at  o th e r  m inorities would 
feel th e  same.
On th e  o th e r  h an d , a t ru ly  bicam eral Parliam ent, with weighting in 
fav ou r of m inorities in the Upper C ham ber, could enh ance  the 
a t tra c t io n  of European Union to su ch  m inorities as well as 
in trod u cing  a potentially  u sefu l additional in st itu tio n .
THE EX EC U TIV E
As we u n d e rs ta n d  i t ,  the D raft T re a ty  p resu p p o ses  th a t  the 
Commission, d eriv in g  i ts  mandate from th e  P arliam ent, would be 
capable  of perform ing th e  fu n ctions  ass ig n ed  in o th e r  con stitu t io n s  
to th e  E x e c u t iv e .  T his  ap p ears  to p re su p p o se ,  in tu r n ,  th at  the 
sole function  of the e x e cu tiv e  is to e x e c u te  the will of the 
le g is la tu re .  We s u g g e st  th at  th is  is not so .
It is an e sse n tia l  function of the ex e cu tiv e  to make political 
c h o ice s .  Given the potentia lly  v ast  ra n g e  of com petence of the 
European Union, the choices  to be made would be numerous an d , in 
many c a s e s ,  u rg e n t .  Is  it c le ar  th at a Commission en joying no 
d ire c t  popular mandate would be cap ab le ,  a c c e p ta b ly ,  of e x e rc is in g  
su ch  choices  ? We would s u g g e st  th a t ,  at any r a te ,  it is  not 
s e l f - e v id e n t .
D RO ITS ACQUIS
The provisional view of B r i t is h  governm ent so u rce s  (se e  P art I I ,  
Section  1) is th a t  Article 82 of the D raft T r e a t y ,  which provides 
fo r  the e n tr y  into force  of the T re a ty  upon ra tif ica tio n  by  Member 
S ta te s  re p re s e n t in g  two th ird s  of the population of the Community, 
would, if  given e f fe c t ,  be c o n tra ry  to in ternational law. For  our 
own p a r t ,  we h a v e ,  to put it at its  low est, g rav e  m isgivings about



























































































the law fulness of A rticle  82 -  p articu lar ly  s ince  th e  ex is t in g  
T re a t ie s  contain e x p r e s s  provision fo r  amendment by  common accord  
of the Member S ta te s  (A r t s .  236 EEC , 96 ECSC and 204 E A E C ).
W hatever th e  law fulness of the e n try  into force  of the new T re a ty  
without the common accord  of the e x is t in g  Member S ta te s  and 
w hatever the legal device  adopted to ach iev e  it [ 2 9 ] ,  it seems to 
us to be c le a r ,  as a m atter both  of Community law and of in te r ­
national law, that the m ajority of the p a rt ie s  to th e  e x is t in g  
T re a t ie s  can n o t,  by e n te r in g  into a new T r e a t y ,  deprive  the 
minority of the d ro its  acqu is  en joyed by  them u n d er  the ex is t in g  
T r e a t ie s .  In the case  of the Community t r e a t ie s ,  th is  must be 
especia lly  so since the C ourt in Van Gend en Loos has emphasised 
th at  th e  b en efic ia r ies  of the Community tre a t ie s  are  "peop les"  and 
not ju s t  s ta te s .  Any attempt by  the m ajority to dep rive  the 
minority of d ro its  acqu is  would th e re fo re  s t r ik e  at th e  moral 
foundations of the Community and of Community law.
It may be su g g e sted  th at  the D raft T re a ty  se ek s  only to p re s e rv e  
and enh ance  the acqu is  com m unautaire; th e re fo re  th e  population of 
n o n -ra t ify in g  Member S ta te s  will be d eprived  , of n o th in g . B u t is 
it not equally  argu able  th at  th e  D raft T re a ty  o f fe r s  a majority of 
the e x is t in g  Member S ta te s  th e  opp ortu nity  to ap p ro p ria te  to 
them selves th e  acquis  communautaire to th e  detrim ent of the 
n o n -co n se n tin g  minority ?
The answ er to th is  question depends on how one d efines  the acqu is  
com m unautaire. But we would s u g g e st  th at  it c o n s is t s ,  not simply 
in su ch  individual r ig h ts  as th e  r ig h t  of f re e  movement, but in 
accep tan ce  of the economic philosophy and the in stitu tion al 
framework en sh rin ed  in th e  e x is t in g  T r e a t ie s .  T he example given 
above of a situation in which th e  European Union sou ght to a lte r  
th e  legislation on s ta te  aids seems to us to i l lu s tra te  th at  the 
acqu is  communautaire does c o n s is t ,  at least in p a r t ,  in the 
philosophical and in stitu tion al s u b s tr u c tu r e  of th e  ex is t in g  
Communities. It  th e re fo re  seems to us to be unavoidable that 
unanimity in b r in g in g  about the European Union in the form proposed 
is a moral, as well as a legal im perative .
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